A case for unforgiveness as a legitimate moral response to historical wrongs by Lozano, Hollman
Journal of Educational Controversy 
Volume 14 
Number 1 The Ethics of Memory: What Does it 
Mean to Apologize for Historical Wrongs 
Article 4 
2020 
A case for unforgiveness as a legitimate moral response to 
historical wrongs 
Hollman Lozano 
Simon Fraser University, hollman_lozano@sfu.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec 
 Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Curriculum and Social Inquiry 
Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Humane Education Commons, Law and Philosophy 
Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Psychology Commons, and the Prison Education and 
Reentry Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lozano, Hollman (2020) "A case for unforgiveness as a legitimate moral response to historical wrongs," 
Journal of Educational Controversy: Vol. 14 : No. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/jec/vol14/iss1/4 
This Article in Response to Controversy is brought to you for free and open access by the Peer-reviewed Journals 
at Western CEDAR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Educational Controversy by an authorized editor 
of Western CEDAR. For more information, please contact westerncedar@wwu.edu. 
A case for unforgiveness as a legitimate moral response to historical wrongs 
Hollman Lozano 







The emergence of forgiveness as the preferred mechanism through which historical wrongs are 
addressed within reconciliation discourses has meant that for the people who cannot forgive or 
will not forgive, there are no alternatives other than insisting on forgiveness until it hopefully 
one day arrives.  As such, the point of unforgiveness is to constitute an agentic space where the 
people who cannot forgive can articulate their stance in ways that not only allow them to 
articulate their resistance to the injunction to forgive, but also constitute alternative spaces 
whereby they can articulate their stance in inclusive ways. If we constitute alternatives to the 
hegemonic injunction to forgive, we might be able to open spaces whereby those who are 
excluded from the reconciliatory discourses, manage to participate and enrich the spaces of 
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“I refuse not to be angry and cannot forgive, what is even more difficult is to have someone 
tell me I should not feel like this…” Bryan Mpaphela, Apartheid victim (cited in 
Verdoolaege Annelies, 2006).  
“And do not forgive, because it is not within your power to forgive in the name of those 
who were betrayed at dawn.” Poet Zbigniew Herbert (quoted in Michnik & Havel, 1993, 
p. 25).  
In this paper, I explore the possibility of unforgiveness as a legitimate response to historical 
wrongs for those who cannot or will not forgive. On a practical note, I am looking for spaces of 
creative dissonance where non-retributive stances are possible in the midst of scenarios of national 
reconciliation or post-conflict. One challenge that emerges from the emphasis on forgiveness in 
post-conflict scenarios could be the supererogation of forgiveness. By the supererogation of 
forgiveness, I refer to the expectation that survivors follow the examples of religious or political 
leaders such as President Nelson Mandela or Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Both Mandela and Tutu 
suffered heinous injustices at the hands of the South African security forces. They opted for 
forgiveness as the most propitious course not only for themselves but also for the country. There 
are countless other people like Mandela or Tutu for whom forgiveness is the most adequate 
alternative. But there are others for whom forgiveness fails to meet their needs, and the calls to 
forgive and follow the steps of supererogation of forgiveness further entrench their disappointment 
with forgiveness as an alternative. And it is for those who cannot follow the steps of those who 
forgive for whom unforgiveness may be an alternative. While some cannot forgive, there might 
also be those who do not consider that their inability to forgive requires much of their attention to 
the point that unforgiveness may not be required as an alternative. If the injunction to forgive does 
not present a moral challenge for them, then unforgiveness does not have much to offer to them. 
In order to clarify this point, it may be useful to bring up Derrida (2001), who argues that “one can 
acquit or suspend judgement and nevertheless refuse to forgive” (p. 33). In that sense, 
unforgiveness is neither acquittal nor suspension of judgment. Unforgiveness is a space for those 
who cannot forgive and find themselves dissatisfied with the alternatives presented by calls for 
reconciliation.  
Although I will use the general term forgiveness, the type of forgiveness I am referring to 
is not what is requested when one steps on someone else’s foot or when one accidentally bumps 
into someone else in a crowded space. The type of forgiveness that concerns this paper is one 
requested from a harm so profound, an injury so heinous that the direct survivors have been undone 
by it to the core of their being (Butler, 2004). The emphasis on the direct survivor is premised on 
the assumption that one can forgive only the actions that directly impact oneself or the 
consequences of those actions upon oneself. To illustrate this point, we could evoke the often-cited 
testimony (Derrida, 2001) of the Black woman who comes to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and whose testimony is translated by Archbishop Tutu as “A commission or a 
government cannot forgive. Only I, eventually, could do it. (And I am not ready to forgive)” (p. 
43). For Derrida, the woman was suggesting that only the dead person could legitimately consider 
forgiveness as an option, for all she could potentially forgive was the consequences of that loss of 
life upon her own. In that sense, I agree with Derrida when I argue that one can only forgive the 
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pernicious actions that directly impacted oneself and the consequences that those actions have on 
one’s life. 
The aim of exploring unforgiveness is to examine it as an agentic space through which 
those who find it morally or emotionally untenable to forgive or are just incapable of forgiving, 
can articulate their disagreement in a manner comparable to what Kohl (1994) described as 
"creative maladjustment" (p. 130). For Kohl, “when it is impossible to remain in harmony with 
one’s environment without giving up deeply held moral values, creative maladjustment becomes 
a sane alternative to giving up altogether” (p. 130). As such, creative maladjustment is a moral 
stance, a retort that springs from one’s moral stance against the societal arrangements that one is 
incapable to reconcile with one’s moral principles. Later on, Kohl goes on to argue that creative 
maladjustment implies  
adapting your own particular maladjustment to the nature of the social systems that 
you find repressive. It also implies learning how other people are affected by those 
systems, how personal discontent can be appropriately turned into moral and 
political action, and how to speak out about the violence that thoughtless adjustment 
can cause or perpetuate. (p. 130). 
Building on Kohl’s concept of creative maladjustment in the case of unforgiveness, we can 
understand it as articulated dissonances, everyday tactics that contest the hegemonic discourse of 
conciliation in ways that are individually and politically empowering. These practices could 
strengthen the political space by bringing to the conversation those who hitherto just had a part in 
the reconciliation discourse by being included through their exclusion, as tends to occur with those 
who do not agree with the path of forgiveness and reconciliation. The point of creative 
maladjustment for unforgiveness is to make possible an alternative other than apathy that 
challenges from a moral stance the repressive structure one opposes.  
The stance of those who cannot or have chosen not to forgive mirrors Kohl’s (1994) 
learning “how not to learn” (p. 2), when people creatively constitute alternatives to the institutional 
arrangements like forgiveness that emerge and which they contest as a matter of principle. Not-
learning, like not-forgiving, is a response to the challenges that the lack of respect for one's stance 
creates. Not-forgiving occurs when the imposition to forgive is veiled as a choice for the good of 
the individual, only that the individual who is expected to forgive is not free to choose to not 
forgive. Her only choice is to agree to forgive, and the questioning of forgiveness entails the 
embracing of hatred and vengeance as its only alternatives. Not-forgiving, like not-learning, allows 
individuals to constitute themselves as other-than and to stand up for that which they believe in, 
even if that means the creation of a marginal space from which the world will be articulated.  
Potentially, those people who chose the path of unforgiveness could have chosen the path 
of forgiveness and work through it until such a point as forgiveness arrives. Moreover, there are 
many survivors for whom such an alternative is successful and Tutu’s (1999) No Future Without 
Forgiveness is full of such examples.  However, if victims like Bryan Mpaphela, the apartheid 
victim quoted at the beginning of this paper, could explore alternatives to forgiving that are neither 
forgiveness nor revenge, as none of those fully represent their stance, an altogether different path 
could emerge. If the survivors are not ready to commit to practices of forgiveness at the end of 
which reconciliation could potentially emerge, nor are they necessarily looking to harbour their 
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wounds in ways that could potentially expose them to the possibilities of retribution, there should 
be an alternative. Somewhere in the middle, those who are standing up for unforgiveness are trying 
to keep distance from both the calls towards forgiveness and the political deployment of anger and 
resentment as tools to retaliate the inflicted wounds. As such, walking the fine line of neither 
forgiveness nor retribution, those exploring the alternative of unforgiveness are seeking the 
possibility of a creative, moral space that is neither vengeance nor forgiveness. It is necessary to 
mention that unforgiveness as a concept operates in different realms, the political as well as psychological, 
when we consider it as a vector of agency for the survivors who cannot forgive, as well as socially 
emancipatory when it seeks to bring together a coalescence of those who resist the injunction to forgive. 
Unforgiveness 
At the risk of sounding prescriptive, I have tentatively found five characteristics of 
unforgiveness: 
1. Unforgiveness is a non-retributive moral stance for direct and indirect survivors to 
respond to harm and wrongdoing when forgiveness is not an alternative for them.  
2. Unforgiveness is a type of principled dissent for the survivors to stand up for their 
moral principles against the calls to forgive and reconcile; it is from that dissent that 
the alternative space of those who cannot forgive is constituted in the first place. 
3. Unforgiveness is also a type of unlearning since the survivors are trying to unlearn the 
assumptions about forgiveness and reconciliation, while also staying clear of the calls 
to vengeance, thereby constituting a space that is neither vengeance nor forgiveness. 
4. Unforgiveness is also a heterotopical space that is constituted once the people who 
cannot forgive come together to constitute alternatives for their plight, validating and 
working with each other’s moral and negative emotions. 
5. Unforgiveness is neither a veiled type of forgiveness, nor a type of apathy, nor is it a 
ruminative type of getting even. It is foremost an alternative that tries to be neither 
vengeance, nor forgiveness, but remains bound within the limits of civility.  
Broadly speaking, when I refer to unforgiveness, I mean a non-retributive moral stance in 
scenarios of national reconciliation or in spaces where forgiveness has been decided as the 
vehicle through which conflict and strife will be overcome. If there is a purpose for 
unforgiveness, it is to become a space in which those who find it morally untenable to 
forgive, or are simply incapable of forgiving, can articulate their disagreement in ways that 
are empowering. Through the inclusion of unforgiveness in the repertoire of legitimate 
moral responses to harm and wrongdoing, a space is opened for the recognition of the role 
of negative emotions and their possibilities as legitimate, teachable responses to 
wrongdoing or harm.  By opening the space to include those who hitherto did not have a 
part, unforgiveness could strengthen the political space by allowing voices that were 
silenced to be included in the conversation about their future.     
As I mentioned above, one of the ways to articulate the disagreement that unforgiveness 
entails is through what Kohl (1994) calls “creative maladjustment” (p. 130), understood as 
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everyday tactics that contest the hegemonic discourse of conciliation in ways that are both 
individually and politically empowering. By bringing to the fore those who had been excluded, 
unforgiveness strengthens rather than thwarts scenarios of conciliation by opening the space to 
those who were not ready to reconcile.  By bringing to the conversation those who previously did 
not have a part, the conversation about forgiveness and possible reconciliation is further enriched 
by including a space for those who cannot forgive.   
The imposition of forgiveness within conciliatory processes (Verdoolage, 2006) not only 
devalues the purposes and ends of forgiveness but also further increases the likelihood of conflict 
and strife shoring up down the road. Foreclosing the social and political space to the survivors that 
could not forgive will further increase a sentiment of us versus them and could have pernicious 
consequences for the narratives of reconciliation.  In other words, the practice of unforgiveness 
constitutes a space for those that, while standing in opposition to the various political, religious 
and social injunctions to forgive, manage to create a stance that while not being forgiveness per 
se, also keeps distance from the calls to retribution that may spring from time to time. As such, the 
practice of unforgiveness is neither a veiled type of forgiveness, a subterfuge through which people 
who cannot forgive are encouraged to think that they are doing other than forgiveness, only to 
discover that they have been led to forgiveness discourse, only through alternative paths. 
  The practice of unforgiveness is also not a type of apathy that uses unforgiveness as a proxy 
to keep distance.  There is a difference between the disinterested survivor who for different reasons 
chooses not to partake and the unforgiving survivor who even with the fear of being reprimanded, 
socially isolated and even pathologized, speaks up. While the former prefers apathy as the means 
to avoid the calls to forgive and reconcile, and fails to express dissent openly, the latter decides to 
speak up about unforgiveness, their pains, and the consequences that forgiving would have for 
them. 
Choosing unforgiveness does not mean opening the space to a shrouded type of vengeance 
whereby survivors who cannot forgive refuse to partake in a forgiveness process as a way to 
retaliate for the wounds inflicted upon them. Unforgiveness is not a ruminative type of getting 
even where the survivors keep to themselves the gift of forgiving as a means to avenge those who 
harmed them.  
The purpose of unforgiveness is not to mobilize the pain of the survivors to further political 
agendas that prevent and hinder policies of forgiveness and reconciliation. The purpose of 
unforgiveness is to bring together those who cannot forgive so that their voices are heard and their 
demands integrated into the general make-up of the discussions about the present and the future of 
the communities once the conflict has abated. Anchored as a fundamental principle of 
unforgiveness is a commitment to equity understanding that the legal, the moral, and the just may 
be at odds particularly in transitional justice settings. Moreover, it is here precisely where 
unforgiveness touches on its morally agentic features, for it allows the survivors to stand up for 
their principled stance against those who seek to mobilize their wounds in ways that further hinder 
those who cannot forgive. As such, the people who choose not to forgive actively choose the side 
of the oppressed survivors who cannot forgive, over and above the laws and the general sentiments 
that demand that survivors just move on from their pain and go on forgiving.  
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The practice of unforgiveness also recognizes the moral dimension of dissent and the role 
it plays in the constitution of a political space, for as Sarat (2005) asserts, dissent itself is the “truest 
expression of loyalty” (p. 7), which takes seriously the discussions that affect them and partakes 
in the political space (Rancière, 2010). Specifically talking about dissent, we could follow the path 
of Graham P. McDonough (2010), who, while exploring the role of dissent within the Catholic 
Church, recognizes that “dissent is a ‘vital concept’ in moral education [that] requires 
acknowledging that some kind of disagreement is germane to the aims of its theory, research and 
practice” (p. 421). As such, if we recognize unforgiveness as a type of dissent that seeks to explore 
the disagreement that exists between the inability of those who cannot forgive and the request that 
they forgive, we can recognize unforgiveness as containing the characteristics of dissent that make 
it a vital concept in moral education. In other words, there is more to unforgiveness than the 
political space that is constituted by the survivors who cannot forgive. The vitality of dissent that 
McDonough (2010) recognizes in moral education is present in unforgiveness, since dissent 
provides the imminent critique of the dissenter from within, who seeks not only to reform the calls 
to forgiveness to include those who cannot forgive, but also to recognize the role and legitimacy 
of the dissenters.   
Unforgiveness as Agency 
One of the common arguments in favour of forgiveness revolves around the agency that 
the survivor gains once forgiveness occurs (Bash, 2007). The moment the survivor decides to 
forgive, the literature on forgiveness suggests that she gains a sense of agency that was not there 
before. That agency, that feeling that they own their destiny and that they have taken steps to take 
care of what happened to them is part of the liberating journey of forgiveness (Thompson, Snyder, 
Hoffman, Michael, Rasmussen, et al., 2005). However, if forgiveness is agentic for those who are 
ready to forgive, it seems to be the exact opposite for those who cannot forgive particularly when 
their inability to forgive is either pathologized or understood as anchored in needs for vengeance. 
Moreover, for those unable to forgive, the injunction to forgive can be a burden that further isolates 
them from the rest of the community and complicates their relationship to their wounds. But if we 
understand agency as “the action that propels deliberate movement through a structure(s) by an 
individual(s) and/or collective(s), with the expressed purpose of achieving a goal or desired 
outcome…” (Maslak, 2008, p. xv), it seems that agency comes from elsewhere. Agency, in this 
case, does not necessarily come from the abandonment of negative emotions, as some scholars 
such as Enright and North (1998) seem to argue. The agency of forgiveness comes from the 
decision made by the survivor who can forgive and the steps she takes towards the process of 
forgiving. So, the agentic features that are afforded to forgiveness in the literature on the subject 
cannot be adjudicated to forgiveness, but to the decision and the act of the survivor who chooses 
a path to deal with the consequences of harm and wrongdoing that was committed. In that regard, 
if the agency to choose forgiveness does not come from the liberatory act of forgiveness but from 
the survivors’ decision and actions towards forgiving, the same conditions could be said to apply 
to the decision for unforgiveness.   
The space of unforgiveness that I am proposing is a politically liberating, transitional space 
for overcoming strife where the survivors can adopt an active stance of positioning themselves 
within a safe community while contesting the political articulations of their pain. Such space of 
unforgiveness is more an interregnum that tries to distance itself from the demands to be either/or 
and seeks to articulate itself in recognition of the needs of the survivors who cannot forgive, as 
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well as preventing that such inability to forgive be coopted by discourses that seek to mobilize it 
for politically pernicious agendas. For rather than a flag to claim or a series of specific demands 
to be articulated, unforgiveness is an auto-poietic space where those who cannot forgive come 
together to articulate themselves as political subjects who are not being considered by the 
injunctions to forgive. The space of unforgiveness is also not or should not be thought of as a mere 
addendum to traditional classroom settings, as proposed by Enright and Worthington in regard to 
forgiveness (Enright, & the Human Development Study Group, 1991; Enright, & North, 1998; 
Worthington, Mazzeo, & Klewer, 2002; Worthington & Scherer, 2004; Worthington, 2005), or 
organized, top-down structures. Unforgiveness is anchored on an individual refusal to accept a 
univocal path and the alternatives that emerge once those who refuse that univocal path come 
together to build those alternatives, rather than remain at the level of the creative maladjustment. 
There are greater gains to be made by deploying unforgiveness in non-traditional group settings 
as well as with communities who traditionally do not have access to formal education. Refugees, 
survivors of domestic violence, indigenous people, the elderly, as well as many other marginalized 
communities are groups of people who are often invited to forgive and who could benefit from 
unforgiveness as an agentic alternative that equips them with tools to articulate their dissent.    
Unforgiveness as I am proposing it is a teachable strategy where the survivors who cannot 
forgive can speak from their specific locality and situatedness. By speaking up, those who cannot 
forgive enter the political scenario assuming the risks of contravening what is a communal 
sentiment towards forgiveness but demanding that overcoming strife not occur over and against 
those who cannot forgive. Rather than hoping for a utopian future that is yet to come, the 
unforgiving subject is aware of her stance and the distance between her needs and the needs of the 
majority, as well as of the consequences that forgiving will possibly have for her and her 
community. From that self-awareness, the survivor demands the opening of the space for those 
who, while disagreeing or being unable to forgive, still belong to the polity and should be 
integrated into the political realm. As such, unforgiveness dissents from the general sentiment that 
sees forgiveness as the only way forward and articulates an alternative path, which, rather than 
hindering the possibilities of reconciliation, strengthens the political space by opening it up to 
those initially excluded. Moreover, by addressing the plight of those who cannot forgive, 
unforgiveness becomes the space for those who do not see themselves represented in the status 
quo and are morally compelled to stand up and demand their inclusion.    
Anchoring unforgiveness in the strategic deployment of a moral sentiment when the 
survivor does not feel sufficiently recognized by a State that failed to protect her could become a 
kernel through which alternative narratives of survivorhood, identity, and dissent are articulated, 
concomitant with and sometimes in opposition to hegemonic discourses of forgiveness. If the 
wound that has not healed is deployed through principled dissent as a strategic articulation that 
calls attention to the erasure of those who cannot forgive, a space of contestation that broadens the 
political spectrum could emerge. Such a site of contestation could become the axis that challenges 
and revises the horizons of forgiveness, as well as the outcome of the process of forgiving that 
benefits not only those who cannot forgive, but also the community as a whole and the process of 
conciliation by bringing even those who disagree to the conversation.    
If the space and practice of unforgiveness occur through principled dissent, a morally 
grounded vector of emancipation could emerge. Survivors hitherto excluded and neglected, could 
"become independent and autonomous... able to think for themselves, to make their own judgments 
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and draw their own conclusions" (Bingham & Biesta, 2010, p. 25) in relation not only to their 
wounded present but also to the past and the way in which the articulation of those two could point 
towards richer futures. Unforgiveness explored as a type of critical emancipation (Gur Ze'ev, 2001; 
McLaren, 2002; Biesta, 1998, 2005) could become a space to challenge structures of power, and 
hierarchies between those who are supposed to know and those who are supposed to obey.  If 
unforgiveness is articulated through a critically emancipatory stance that assumes equality, not as 
an end or the conclusion of the shaping of unruly souls, but as a default from which emancipation 
is to occur (Rancière, 1991), we can begin to see the agentic potential of unforgiveness. So, if we 
argue that unforgiveness borrows from Rancière's (1999) understanding of equality understood as 
an "open set of practices driven by the assumption of equality between any and every speaking 
being and by the concern to test this equality" (p. 30), we could see the agentic, emancipatory 
features of unforgiveness. So those facilitating unforgiveness, rather than talking down from the 
position of the one who knows, recognizes that those who are trying to articulate spaces of 
unforgiveness have already had a powerful moment of self-awareness that brought them to this 
point. Moreover, it was precisely in those powerful moments of self-awareness where they have 
recognized their stances about their wounds and the way in which that uneasiness would place 
them at odds with the demands to forgive. So, they chose to pay the price of maladjustment, rather 
than abandoning their moral sentiments, and sought the spaces to articulate their dissent.   
Unforgiveness as Disagreement 
Unforgiveness is understood here as a moral, rational, legitimate response to harm and 
wrongdoing that seeks ways to articulate and integrate those who have been harmed into the 
political space in ways that afford them dignity and equality. Anchored in an understanding of 
dissent as a vital concept in moral education (McDonough, 2010), unforgiveness seeks to ground 
its stance on the contestation of disagreements that are anchored in fundamental moral tenets of 
the survivors who cannot forgive. This allows richer, more inclusive and diverse alternatives to 
emerge.  
However, unlike the critically empowering, morally grounded understanding of 
unforgiveness that has been advocated above, the current research on forgiveness understands 
unforgiveness as correlated with higher degrees of psychopathology (Mauger, Perry, Freeman, & 
Grove,1992; Maltby, Macaskill, & Day, 2001; Worthington, Mazzeo, & Klewer, 2002). Failure to 
forgive oneself has been connected to more intra-punitive pathologies, such as anxiety and 
depression, while failure to forgive others has been associated with extra-punitive pathologies, 
such as social alienation, social introversion, depression, and psychosis (Macaskill, Maltby, and 
Day, 2001). Unforgiveness is also understood to be a part of a person's internalized negative affect, 
and it may become detrimental both by causing addictive behaviours and by being a result of such 
addictive behaviours (Worthington, et al., 2002).  
Along the lines of unforgiveness, trait vengefulness (or the tendency to be unforgiving) is 
associated with an increase in maladaptive, avoidance-based relationship behaviours 
(McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; McCullough, & Bono, 2004). In other words, the 
general conclusions from forgiveness research are that unforgiveness, or failing to forgive, have 
pernicious consequences both at the individual and communitarian level, which go from 
depression, anxiety, and psychosis, to name only a few.  
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However, there is a body of literature slowly emerging that points out that the refusal to 
forgive is a moral, cognitive stance. This cognitive stance, unlike most understandings of not 
forgiving, does not have adverse health consequences for those who either refuse or are unable to 
forgive (Stackhouse, Ross & Boon, 2016). The importance of unforgiveness as a cognitive moral 
stance, without the pernicious consequences of what has been referred to as unforgiving, stands in 
direct contrast to most of the literature, which understands unforgiveness more as a disease, or a 
pathology (Stackhouse, et al., 2016).   
If we recognize that the pragmatic benefits that have been linked with forgiving may not 
necessarily follow, and ground unforgiveness as an agent-driven stance where the survivors own 
their destinies, the current understanding of forgiveness will necessarily shift. In other words, if 
unforgiveness is understood as an agentic decision made by the individual, a conscious moral 
stance where the survivor chooses not to forgive, then the widely held belief that understands 
unforgiveness as an affliction or an ailment can and should be contested (Zechmeister & Romero, 
2002). As such, this might be an opportunity to move beyond the association of Stackhouse, et 
al.’s (2016) findings when they argue about the causal association that presupposes that ruminative 
types of unforgiveness entail the negative affect of the transgression. But if those negative affects 
are curtailed and addressed properly, the health benefits that have been attributed to forgiveness, 
namely stress and anger reduction, (Seawell, Toussaint, & Cheadle, 2014; Witvliet, Ludwig, & 
Vander Laan, 2001; Worthington, Witvliet, Pietrini, & Miller, 2007; Harris & Thoresen, 2005) 
can also be enjoyed by those who are unable to forgive. Thus, if the benefits that the research 
adjudicates to forgiving can also be obtained through the management of the emotions, then the 
pragmatics of forgiveness lose the main argument about the benefits of forgiving.   
If educators continue teaching that there are no alternatives to managed dissent or effective 
ways to articulate the moral response that negative emotions enunciate, we will be doing a 
disservice, not only to education, but also to people's ability to deal with their past as well as their 
roles in enunciating their social and political stances in paternalistic political systems (Giroux, 
1997, 2000, 2003; Kohl, 1994). If, on the other hand, we could recognize their refusal to forgive 
in all its moral significance and teach them to articulate their dissent in agentic ways that encourage 
them as individuals and citizens with voices worth hearing, creative possibilities can emerge. If 
the dissent of those who cannot forgive is articulated through principled disagreement, their 
articulation of unforgiveness will open the political space as a site for contestation, rather than a 
preconceived deliberative stance that is anchored in an unequal distribution of power that weigh 
in the silence of some to the detriment of others.  
Unforgiveness as Principled Dissent  
In an epoch in which Schmitt’s (1932/2008) articulation of the political as a division 
between friend and enemy seems to have taken hold of the political spectrum yet again, there is 
paramount value on the principled dissent that anchors unforgiveness. There is a value on 
disagreeing with the imposition that the social milieu weighs in on people, particularly when those 
impositions stand in direct opposition to one's principles, even if those social impositions are for 
one's own good and the good of one’s community. Before being socially and politically articulated, 
unforgiveness manifests through a discomfort, an inability to go along with the calls to forgive, or 
what Kohl (1994) refers to as the "unavoidable challenges to her or his personal family loyalties, 
integrity and identity" (p. 6) that a survivor faces. The uneasiness of the wounded person who 
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cannot forgive is, however, articulated through a dissent that is other than the mere refusal to 
forgive. For unforgiveness is not simply the stance of someone who is ostracized in her pain and 
who enters into dynamics of rancorous contestation and conflict. The articulation of that dissent, 
the passage from the intimate and private to the public and contested, is constituted through an 
exercise of principled dissent that recognizes the locality and prescience of the wound, seeks to 
articulate spaces that are neither forgiveness nor vengeance, whereby those who cannot forgive 
can also coalesce and articulate their social and political demands.   
There is an agentic value that needs to be understood and acknowledged by those who 
recognize that their relation to their wound is different from the one that is articulated by those 
who advocate for forgiveness. As such, there should be a space through which they can intervene 
in the political, demand to be heard, and influence the political realm without being cast as opposite 
to and enemies of, for such binaries only reinforce the Schmittian binaries of reducing rather than 
fostering the political as a space of deliberative contestation. 
Although the difference between the space of contestation and argumentation seems 
tenuous, it is important to notice, following Phillips (2015), that the space of contestation, unlike 
the space for argumentation, allows for new and disruptive discourses to emerge in a more 
irreverent creative fashion. The space of contestation that Phillips devises expands Foucault’s idea 
(1972) of “spaces of dissent” (p. 152), where he understands dissent as more than mere 
disagreements between parties that ultimately will converse and resolve their differences. To 
articulate the space of unforgiveness, along the lines of spaces of dissent, it needs to be 
acknowledged that those who recognize themselves as unable to forgive position themselves as 
other than, different from those who are able and willing to forgive and / or those who seek any 
type of retaliation (Phillips, 2015). Moreover, that caesura, that space created between the 
survivors who can and will possibly forgive and those who are looking for alternatives to 
forgiveness, constitutes a space of contestation about the way in which overcoming strife will be 
articulated. Those who enunciate their inability to forgive also articulate their differences from 
those who can forgive, and through that caesura, they constitute themselves as not being among 
those with the political position of being ready and able to move on. However, they also constitute 
themselves as moral and political subjects who recognize and voice their needs in ways that differ 
and contravene the demands to move on that substantiate the demands for forgiveness. Through 
the enunciation and the demand for a space in which their demands can be articulated in ways that 
do not entail erasure and/or oblivion, they intervene in the realm of the political and challenge the 
univocal discourse that tries to articulate forgiveness as the only way forward.   
The moral articulation of the dissent of those who cannot forgive is not merely the 
enactment of their wounds. It is also the constitution of a particular node of coalescence that brings 
them together and makes them into politically distinct subjects in a way that they were not before 
their public articulation of dissent and before their seizing of the political spectrum to address their 
moral demands about forgiveness. Moreover, if unforgiveness allows a process of subjectification 
that articulates the stance of those who cannot forgive and who were erased from the political 
spectrum, such principled disagreement will articulate an agonistic understanding of the 
engagement that sees "[t]he essence of politics resid[ing] in the modes of dissensual 
subjectification that reveal a society in its difference to itself” (Ranciere, 2010, p. 42). Such 
principled articulation of difference, the moral uttering of a stance that differs from the impressions 
and/or the wishes of the religious or political majority that advocates for forgiveness, will 
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necessarily broaden the space of engagement, since it will challenge the consensus of those who 
speak on behalf and for the betterment of the community.    
At this point, it is important to note the similarities that exist between the articulations of 
unforgiveness sketched above and what authors like Foster (2007) denominate as ethical 
resistance, which is understood as “tak[ing] a high stakes stance, one that may cost in terms of 
status and reputation, but which gives us the inner freedom to act consistently on the basis of one’s 
conscience” (p. 20). So ethical resistance, like unforgiveness, is constituted by a stance of 
principled dissent where the survivors come out even against the powers that be at their own risk 
and dissent from the general population’s opinion. Like unforgiveness, ethical resistance is more 
than the rational criticism levied against that which one opposes. It presupposes as untenable the 
present or future envisaged by the general populace and, from a principled moral position, opens 
up a space of contestation, for as Foster argues “[e]thical resistance preserves one’s own integrity 
as premised on conscience that animates the rational, action being” (p. 20).   
Although it could be argued that there is a prevalence of the political over the pedagogical 
in the space of unforgiveness that is articulated through principled dissent, the intention is to 
constitute alternative spaces of emancipation that are fundamentally political, a la Rancière, rather 
than psychologically emancipatory, such as Freire's (2018). For as Bingham argued (2010) the 
difference between the two emancipatory models is that, while the subject of the emancipation 
accomplished through the Freirean model is fundamentally psychological, Rancière's type of 
emancipation is decidedly political. As such, considering that the issue of the injunction to forgive 
(Gudan,2006) is a moral and psychological issue with profound political consequences, it is 
imperative that we anchor the type of emancipation that we are seeking to deploy through 
principled dissent, in a Rancierean type of emancipation as Bingham argued (2010).   
The broadening of the political space, the inclusion of those hitherto excluded in the name 
of a better future, and the full consideration of their inability to forgive through their integration 
into the conversation about the social and individual future will be proclaimed through an active 
enactment of political argumentation. Such active enactment of the political argumentation occurs 
via the challenging of the common understandings that each side has of forgiveness as well as the 
requirements that such forgiveness will entail, especially from the perspective of those who cannot 
forgive.  
The space of dissensus, the moral articulation of a disagreement that is anchored in 
principled dissent, constitutes the political emergence of a vague political subject that was not 
there before the announcement of unforgiveness. For while there might have been assumptions, 
hints and/or voices about the dangers of the path towards reconciliation and the consequences of 
an unfulfilled justice, the intelligibility of the position of the other remains an imaginative exercise, 
rather than a politically present one. However, the articulation of unforgiveness as an agentic, 
politically empowering stance will eventually constitute a heterotopical space (Foucault, 1998, p. 
176). This space is other than the utopic space of a community that has moved beyond conflict or 
the dystopia of an endless conflict that is fueled by the vindictiveness of those who cannot forgive. 
The heterotopical space of unforgiveness that is neither forgiveness nor vengeance is 
"utterly different from all the emplacements that they reflect or refer to" (Foucault, 1998, p. 178) 
and constitutes itself into an articulation of the needs, fears, and concerns of the survivors who 
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cannot forgive. In the case of unforgiveness, one could not talk of either a heterotopia of 
accumulation or of heterotopias of time among others. However, since heterotopias are "a kind of 
contestation both mythical and real of the space in which we live" (Foucault, 1998, p. 179), there 
is a sense in which we could talk about a heterotopia of affect since the space that is being 
articulated tries to manage the moral and affective stances of those who cannot forgive. 
The emergence of a heterotopical space of unforgiveness manages to challenge the real 
politics of those for whom it is either forgiveness or mayhem (Tutu, 1999) as well as those who 
only see a Calliclean (Plato, 2018) or Thrasymachian (Plato, 2016 understanding of justice as the 
only way out of a conflict. As such, the heterotopical space of unforgiveness as it has been hinted 
at here could become a materiality that seeks to challenge the present of the survivors who cannot 
forgive, aiming at a utopian future that is grounded on a present that contests their oblivion and 
the injunction to forgive as the only alternatives to survivorhood.   
Recognizing Unforgiveness 
The constitutive characteristics of unforgiveness as an organic space assembled for and by 
the survivors is their resistance against the injunction to forgive. That resistance is paired with 
their poietic stance that seeks to create heterotopical spaces that can articulate distinctive 
perspectives to the dyad of either vengeance or forgiveness as well as transversal frames of 
reference that challenge the simplistic top-down or bottom-up approaches that stultify the 
emergence of dissonant alternatives to the plight of those who cannot forgive.  
  Traditionally resistance and disobedience have been understood as a sign of maladjusted 
individuals who have not fully comprehended or integrated to the demands that society places on 
them and as such signs of disobedience and resistance are often met with disciplinary measures. 
However, emerging research in moral education (Callan, 1997; McDonough, 2010, 2012; 
Leighteizer, 2006) is recognizing the role that resistance and dissent have not only in the life of 
the dissenter but also in their communities. In the specific case of the people who either refuse or 
are not able to forgive, there is a value on refusing to move on from the situatedness of their 
wounds and disobeying the demands of those who, without recognizing the wounds of the 
survivors, impose their agendas on their lives. Those who cannot forgive through the "creative 
maladjustment” (Kohl, 1994, p. 130) of their inability to forgive, create a parrhesiastic (Foucault, 
2001) stance against the imperative to forgive carrying out Ranciere's (2010) dictum, according to 
which "...the essential work of politics is the configuration of its own space. It is to make the world 
of its subjects and its operations seen. The essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus as 
the presence of two worlds in one" (p. 37). The articulation of their perspective, the heterotopia 
(Foucault, 1998) that is uttered by their contestation of the narratives of forgiveness, de facto opens 
a space where there was none, creating dissensus where there were only majoritarian voices 
speaking in favour of leaving their wounded pasts behind.  
This heterotypical space (Foucault, 1998) articulated through the principled dissent and 
resistance of those who cannot forgive will start as an incomprehensible site of contestation. The 
process of recognition of a political agent goes through the inability to understand what the one 
with whom one disagrees is trying to articulate. The voices of those who cannot forgive constitute 
both the subject and the space that are enacted and made intelligible in a way that was not there 
before the emergence of unforgiveness.  
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Although the heterotopical (Foucault, 1998) space of unforgiveness is somewhat structured 
above, it is imperative that it be practiced outside the arboreal (Deleuze & Guattari, 1998, p. 8), 
hierarchical structures of power; otherwise, the space of unforgiveness will become a coded, 
prescriptive, pyramidal space based on rules, obedience, and compliance. For as Wallin (2013) 
argued when exploring Guattari's (2015) concept of transversality (p. 112), there is a sense in 
which "insofar as education is organized under an institutional superego, the potential for student 
autonomy and autonomous manifestations within the schools would be functionally crippled" (p. 
39). If the space of unforgiveness becomes such a deeply structured space, the agentic, 
emancipatory possibilities of principled dissent will lose its possibilities. In its place, a series of 
prescriptive steps to manage people and their emotions will emerge, preventing the alternatives to 
forgiveness to be creative and organic.  
While it has been noted above that the heterotopical (Foucault, 1998) space is not 
necessarily a conventional classroom, since it can be deployed in non-traditional classroom 
settings, there is a sense in which an institutional superego could also emerge in non-traditional 
pedagogic spaces with equally pernicious consequences.  As such, instead of presupposing models 
that are imposed from the top down, in what Kreisberg (1992) referred as "power over" (p. 70), 
the alternatives to the injunction to forgive (Hampton, 1998) should be thought of as an 
implementation of "power with" (Kreisberg, 1992 p. 70).  
Power with is understood as a stance through which those who cannot forgive articulate 
their dissent and seek strategies to reconstitute a political space in ways that are inclusive and 
equitable. The most appropriate tool to challenge the sedimentations of power that could emerge 
with the solidification of the space of unforgiveness will be  
"transversality [since, it] is a dimension that strives to overcome two 
impasses; that of pure verticality and a simple horizontality. Transversality tends to 
be realized when maximum communication is brought about between different 
levels and above all in terms of different directions." (Guattari, 1972, 2003, p. 63)  
Unforgiveness challenges the oppositional stance of either vertical exercises of power or 
sheer horizontality, which can also cripple the self-constitution of the group through indecision 
and uncertainty. The transversal model challenges the unyielding solidifications of power so that 
as Aoki (2005, cited by Wallin, 2013) argued when referring to transversality, "pedagogy pertains 
more to the formation and conceptualization of assemblages as it does the orthodox scene of 
student-teacher transference" (p. 36). As such, if we were to articulate the pedagogy of 
unforgiveness closer to an organic, unprescribed, creative space that articulates dissent outside the 
sedimentations of traditional pedagogic places that Aoki (2005) sought to challenge, we could 
deploy alternatives through which agency and freedom could emerge.  
The heterotopical (Foucault, 1998) space of unforgiveness that is anchored and 
substantiated in principled dissent, rather than articulating what Kant (1900) referred to as the 
pedagogical paradox, is understood as this: "How do I cultivate freedom through coercion?" 
(Bingham & Biesta, 2010 p. 28), which will seek to cultivate freedom through a transversal 
(Guattari, 1972, 2003) articulation of difference that manages to prevent coercion per se. The 
heterotopical space, while attentive of how different perspectives coalesce into the constitution of 
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a pedagogical space, keeps distance and constitutes itself as other than both forgiveness and 
vengeance, while still being determined by them.  
To summarize, the space for unforgiveness is a space of dissent and resistance whereby the 
survivors can articulate their objections, demand their voices be heard, and ask for social and 
political policies that address them as political subjects. Failing to listen and address their concerns 
while asking them to forgive will hinder some of the features of what Young (1990) defined as the 
enabling conceptions of justice that open the way for processes of revictimization in the name of 
forgiveness. Young’s (1990) enabling conceptions of justice include “not only distribution but 
also, the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual 
capacities and collective communication and cooperation" (p. 39). 
Failing to listen and address the concerns of the survivors who cannot forgive will further 
revictimize them and ostracize them from the political space of conciliation, opening the space for 
possible articulations of violence in the name of vengeance. The worthiest of reconciliation is 
oppressive if it fails to integrate principles of social justice “affirming … human agency and human 
capacities working collaboratively to create change” (Adams, Bell, &, Griffin, 2007, p. 2), thereby 
limiting the possibilities of a better society.   
Unforgiveness requires the recognition that there is more than one way to move beyond 
survivorhood and pain. An openness to the possibility that while the survivors could not choose 
what happened to them, at least they can choose how to deal with the consequences in ways that 
are agentic, empowering and community-building beyond the immediacy of their victimhood.  
Unforgiveness requires that the survivors who do not feel that forgiveness is an alternative 
for them be granted the opportunity to articulate such disagreement and to constitute themselves 
as political subjects who, from that moral stance, work through their negative emotions looking 
for alternatives that, within the limits of civility, constitute that space that is neither forgiveness 
nor vengeance. This space recognizes that there is a role and a function that negative emotions 
play in the life of such survivors and, rather than neglecting and pathologizing them, integrates 
them to the legitimate array of responses that a survivor experiences, so that they are not further 
re-victimized for not being able to forgive.   
Along the same lines of the recognition of not forgiving as a legitimate response to harm 
and wrong-doing, there are positive features that emerge from the recognition of the survivors’ 
standing up for their principles and paying the price for dissenting from the opinion of the majority. 
There are agentic, moral features that emerge from the survivors’ exercise of free speech that, 
along with the recognition of the role and value of negative emotions, makes principled 
disagreement a moral stance that should be strengthened. There is a price of social isolation and 
neglect that is paid by the those who refuse to go along the positions of the majority, and that hefty 
price should be recognized in all its dimensions. This is imperative, particularly when it is none 
other than the survivors who speak up and stand up through their principled disagreement about 
how the silent majorities revictimize them.   
If we were to go back to the initial examples of Bryan Mpaphela and the poet Zbigniew 
Herbert and think of unforgiveness as an alternative to their plight, one of the first requirements 
will be to recognize that each one of them comes from a specific moral stance that sees the demands 
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of forgiveness as too onerous, fundamentally impractical in the midst of their experience of the 
conflict, or simply immoral. Irrespective of the naming of the stance, the basis of their position 
entails that forgiveness is simply not an option within the particularities of their experience.    
If we consider the possibility that Mpaphela and Herbert could have explored an alternative 
such as unforgiveness that addressed their inability to forgive while at the same time providing 
them with agentic tools to open the space of political participation and challenge the hegemonic 
discourse of forgiveness, this could open the heterotopical space of unforgiveness in a way that is 
not only inclusive and agentic, but also affords the survivors alternatives beyond the 
governmentality of forgiveness. If we are able move the survivors beyond their legitimate 
recognition of their inability to forgive toward more propositive stances that seek to alter the space 
of the political, we could strengthen the space of the political by including those who hitherto have 
been excluded. In other words, rather than the stultification of the survivors who cannot forgive, 
unforgiveness seeks to provide alternatives for their emancipation that recognize not only their 
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